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ABSTRACT: The theory and reality of chief executive 
compensation is explored in this paper. The study here uses 
a panel of data on 143 executives from America’s largest 
corporations. The results suggest that earlier theoretical 
expectations and empirical findings of compressed wage 
scales may not hold when top-level managers are included.  
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 According to several studies, the 1980's saw the income 
distribution of the United States grow more unequal (see  
Littman 1989). The group at the top of the earned income 
distribution are the chief executive officers (CEOs) of 
America's largest corporations. Are these meni paid 
according to their contribution to corporate profitability, 
or have they become part of an entrenched technocracy that 
keeps a sharp look at their own interests first and 
corporate viability second? 
    Over fifty years ago Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means 
wrote in The Modern Corporation and Private Property that 
“we are dealing not only with distinct but often opposing 
groups, ownership on the one side, control on the other--a 
control which tends to move further and further away from 
ownership and ultimately to lie in the hands of management 
itself, a management capable of perpetuating its own 
position” (1932, p. 124). This hypothesis has been 
investigated by a number of more recent authors who have 
described what seems to be a growing division between 
ownership and control in American corporations (see Marris 
1963, Williamson 1963, Manne 1965, Galbraith 1967, Masson 
1971, Edwards 1977, and Crain, Deaton and Tollison 1977). 
No longer does the owner-entrepreneur command the heights 
of most large American corporations. Typically, the high-
ground of large corporations is occupied by the CEOs, men 
who command a large network of vice presidents, engineers, 
and thousands of others by virtue of being successful as 
organization men.  
    This hypothesis of separate interests of the top 
managers and owners will be explored in this paper by 
looking at the pay of CEO’s versus their performance for 
the stockholders. If this separation has indeed reached a 
point where the top managers respond to incentives that are 
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different than those of the owners, then the lack of a 
connection between their pay and corporate performance 
should be seen empirically in a low correlation between pay 
and performance, ceteris paribus.  
   This lack of pay for performance has been investigated 
recently, both theoretically and empirically, by Robert 
Frank (1984). Frank brought renewed interest to an old 
theme in economics, pointing out that utility functions 
that do not exclude important social relations may help 
explain how compensating differentials for status might 
compress firm wage distributions. In other words, Frank 
argues that by trading off status for wages the firm’s pay 
scale may be more egalitarian than payment for marginal 
products would predict. CEOs, who are commanding the 
largest firms in the U.S., certainly have high status 
within their firms. If Frank’s hypothesis is correct, then 
the over 2 million dollar average ($2,090,191 in 1988) the 
CEOs of the nations largest firms receive may be an 
understatement of their contribution to the firm.  
    Is Frank’s hypothesis applicable to the highest reaches 
of American firms or are their high salaries evidence that 
they are beyond the control of the shareholders? If Frank’s 
hypothesis applies to CEO’s, then his prediction of greater 
equality in pay than performance alone would dictate would 
give a similar prediction to that of Berle and Means. Both 
of these theories then predict no clear connection between 
CEO pay and corporate performance. Evidence here is brought 
to bear in an attempt to decide which theory seems better 
able to explain CEO compensation.  
   Data on CEO earnings from America’s top 1,000 
corporations for 1988 and 1989 will be used here to see if 
this high compensation can be linked with corporate 
performance and if the compression hypothesis posited by 
Frank can be supported. 
   The paper is organized as follows. First, the 
theoretical arguments for CEO compensation and competitive 
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wage determination in light of possible compensating 
differentials are summarized. Next, the model and the data 
used are discussed. Finally, the empirical results of 
estimates of earnings equations are presented, followed by 
the conclusion.  
 
Theory 
 
   Neoclassical wage theory is founded on the competitive 
determination of the equality between wages and the 
employee’s marginal product. Numerous authors have 
elaborated on this theory to help explain circumstances 
that seem at variance with what a simple theory would 
predict. Recent elaborations have included compensating 
differentials for the inherent riskiness of a job (see 
Thaler and Rosen 1975, Biddle and Zarkin 1988), the degree 
of turnover (see Smith 1979, Garen 1988), etc. Robert Frank 
(1984), working with the compensating differential concept 
a few years ago, asked the question: “Are workers paid 
their marginal products?” By using interdependent utility 
functions that include status as an argument, his 
theoretical conclusion and empirical results answered this 
question with a resounding no. In particular, Frank posited 
that cost-minimizing firms in competitive labor markets 
will have pay schedules (W) that are functions of marginal 
products (MP). He further argued that the slope of a wage 
schedule that is a function of the employees’ marginal 
products (dW(MP)/dMP), instead of being unity, will be 
significantly less than one.  
     This prediction put in the framework of CEO 
compensation would be somewhat similar to Berle’s and 
Means’ theory of a technocratic usurpation of power. 
Berle's and Means’ theory highlighting the lack of control 
of stockholders could be restated for CEOs as dW(MP)/dMP ≅ 
0. Empirically this prediction might be difficult to 
disentangle from Frank’s if only CEO’s are considered. 
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However, the lack of a powerful connection between 
productivity and reward for the executives, resulting in a 
near zero derivative, may not hold true when considering 
the CEO versus other employees of the same firm. Under 
Berle’s and Means’ reasoning, the very powerful CEO may 
indeed have a higher marginal product than many others in 
the firm, but the inordinate amount of power the CEO (and 
other top managers) wields allows pay to far outstrip 
performance. Hence, when considering CEOs alongside other 
employees in the same firm the earnings function may in 
fact have a slope greater than one, contrary to Frank’s 
prediction.  
 
The Model and the Data 
 
   The model employed in the empirical analysis is an 
adaptation of the model used by Frank (1984). Salary and 
bonus of the CEOs are assumed to be a function of the 
firm’s return on equity, hence to the owners of the firm 
the marginal product of the CEO is hypothesized to be 
reflected in the earnings of the firm. The CEO is certainly 
not the sole determiner of firm profitability, but as a 
steward of the firm his salary should correlate with the 
return to his ultimate employers, the stockholders.  
   The Securities and Exchange Commission requires public 
companies to report to stockholders, in the company’s proxy 
statement, the dollar compensation of the five highest paid 
employees, but formulas to determine compensation tied to 
the companies stock, profits, etc., are not often made 
public. These formulas are usually used to determine the 
bonus and/or the long-term compensation (e.g., stock 
options). A common type of formula of those made public 
would, for example, create a fund for the top executives of 
6 percent of net income after paying a 7 percent return on 
equity (a “six-over-seven” formula). In looking for any 
pay-for-performance correlation, the use of these formulas 
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by firms gives added significance to using return on equity 
(ROE) as the primary explanatory variable. The secrecy 
surrounding these formulas (when they exist at all) which 
often form the basis of long-term compensation, the 
irregular timing of redemption (and hence valuation), and 
the short time frame of the data set make using total 
compensation as the dependent variable undesirable, since 
this would bias the results towards no correlation between 
pay and performance.ii Other compensation that is not 
included in the dependent variable is the value of various 
perks that CEOs often enjoy. These perks tend not to make 
up as large a portion of American CEOs total compensation 
as it does for their European and Japanese counterparts, 
but the use of sizable perks is quite widespread.iii For 
example, it is estimated that 68 percent of CEOs use 
company cars, 40 percent use chauffeur service, 55 percent 
get country-club membership, etc.iv   
    To help explain the variance in compensation due to 
such factors as industry concentration, regional economic 
strength, etc., other variables were included to capture 
these effects. The inclusion of these additional variables 
helps prevent bias on the coefficient on ROE due to the 
omission of other possibly important factors. This 
inclusion of related variables, besides helping to prevent 
bias, allows an empirical test of alternative theories of 
CEO compensation. Hence, the equation estimated was,  
 
Salary & Bonus = f(ROE, Tenure, Age, Sales, Industry,   
   Region, Time)        (1) 
 
   The data used here comes from data gleaned by the 
combined efforts of Standard & Poor’s Compustat Services 
and Business Week magazine.v The executives selected for 
inclusion come from the top 1,000 U.S. publicly-held firms 
according to market valuation. After combining data for 
1988 and 1989, the number of firms that had all of the 
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above mentioned variables for both years reduced the data 
set to 143 executives over the two years.  
   In operationalizing the earnings equation, equation (1)  
above was augmented with industry and regional interaction 
effects and the effects of ROE were also estimated as 
industry specific. Starting with the least restrictive 
specifications permitted by the data, constraints were 
gradually imposed that were considered acceptable by 
appropriate F tests (see Hsiao 1986).  
   If the standard hypothesis of neoclassical theory is 
correct, that these executives are paid their marginal 
product, then it is also true that ROE and sales are a 
function of the quality of the CEO that is hired; i.e., ROE 
and sales are a function of the dependent variable. Hence, 
under the hypothesis that these workers are paid their 
marginal product, equation (1) becomes part of a 
simultaneous equation system. To deal with the possible 
endogeneity of ROE and sales, these variables were 
instrumented. The Kiviet-Wu instrument validity test was 
used to compare the relative merits of the least squares 
and instrumental variable specifications.vi  
 
Empirical Results 
 
    The summary figures in Table 1 indicate the CEOs 
averaged over $1.9 million dollars a year in total 
compensation over the two year period. There was a slight 
drop in average total compensation over the period that was 
coincident with a drop in the return on equity (from 16.9 
percent to 15.4 percent), but at the same time the average 
combined salary and bonus went up slightly. The average age 
of the CEOs in the study were 57 years old (the youngest 
was 42 and the maximum was 76) and they had held the CEO 
position for about eight and half years. Of the fourteen 
industries in the sample, banking was best represented and 
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as expected the highest number of CEOs came from firms 
based in the northeast.  
    Table 2 shows that quite a difference exists in the ROE 
between the top and bottom twenty-five observations. This 
multiple of difference in ROE is not reflected in either 
total compensation or in the combined salary and bonus 
figures. This compression of pay relative to performance is 
more in line with Frank’s (dW(MP)/dMP < 1) hypothesis than 
with Berle's and Means’ (dW(MP)/dMP ≅ 0). Long-term 
compensation, which is often directly tied to stock 
performance, does seem to follow the changes in ROE much 
more closely. 
    The estimates of the earnings equation specified in 
equation (1) are reported in Table 3. The least squares 
estimate listed in column one is the best estimate 
according to F tests for parameter constraints.vii The pooled 
estimate of the ROE parameter reported in equation (1) 
shows statistical significance, albeit a weak one, in the 
relation between ROE and CEO compensation. The industry 
specific ROE parameters in the earnings equation in column 
(2) show little statistical strength, and in fact, as 
mentioned above, were rejected for the pooled ROE parameter 
in equation (1). The pooled estimate predicted that for 
every 1 percent increase in return that CEO pay will go up 
by a little over $7000.  
    The sales effect is the most powerful among all 
variables. The rather precisely estimated sales effect 
signifies that for every $1 million increase in sales, CEO 
compensation will take 2.1 percent of this increase, or 
$21,000. This strong connection between sales and CEO pay, 
and not between ROE and CEO pay, gives support to Berle's 
and Means’ hypothesis that these executives are looking 
after the welfare of their bureaucracy and not necessarily 
the owners of the firm. This strong connection with firm 
sales introduces the possibility that executives may be 
taking such large increases in earnings that the wage 
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scale, with the high-end included, may actually be more 
dispersed (i.e., dW(MP)/dMP > 1). Estimates that middle-
managers received only seventy-five percent of the 
percentage increase in top management pay in 1989 is 
additional evidence that just the opposite of compression 
is taking place.viii  
 
Conclusion 
 
    The results seem to verify Berle's and Means’ 
conjecture that a technocracy has wrested significant power 
from the stockholders (and nowadays that often means the 
workers of the firm as well).ix Frank’s hypothesis is 
difficult to disentangle from this data but some of the 
results here and from other data lead to rejection of 
compression when the high end of the pay scale is 
considered together with middle and lower income workers. 
This could be due to the factors described in Berle's and 
Means’ hypothesis, a general loss of worker clout, or some 
other explanation unexplored here. There is some small 
evidence here (e.g., Table 2) that if the sample is 
restricted to CEOs some wage compression may be observed, 
but outside of restricted pay ranges this effect seems to 
be swamped by other factors, even making the observed wage 
scale amplified; i.e., the opposite of compressed. 
   Since only the top executives’ pay is required in 
company proxy statements, evidence for or against wage 
compression at the high-end of the pay scale is difficult 
to obtain, but aggregate data is highly suggestive of the 
opposite having taken place. CEO pay has gone from 
approximately 19 times greater than that of an engineer in 
1960 to over 44 times greater in 1988. The same relative 
increase is evidenced in comparison to other occupations as 
well.x  The above change in relative pay is actually an 
underestimate of the change that has taken place in after-
tax income.  
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   The democratic angst that many feel at hearing of such 
high salaries may have an economic counterpart apart from 
the waste of just being greater than individual 
performance.  
Recent developments in micro and macroeconomics have 
pointed to the possibility that an economy based on an 
assortment of participation schemes (e.g., profit-sharing, 
ESOP's, etc.) may have positive effects on productivity by 
increasing worker identification with the firm, increasing 
information flows, etc (see Weitzman 1985, Rosen and Quarry 
1987). These participation schemes are unlikely to be 
effective if the rewards from increased productivity are to 
be disproportionately bestowed upon top management.xi 
   The CEOs of these companies do not seem to be 
complaining these days of too small a pay check, but many 
stockholders are.xii Few companies are likely to follow the 
strict five-to-one ratio in the pay scale of the quickly 
growing Ben & Jerry’s ice cream company, but the days of 
the unfettered compensation committee created by management 
is also unlikely to continue.xiii The current practice in many 
companies of management hiring compensation consultants to 
tell the stockholders what management pay should be is 
likely to be gradually replaced by committees with more 
outside representation and with compensation formulas that 
tie pay more closely to company performance.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Relevant Variablesxiv  
 
 
Variable 
  
Mean  
 
Standard  
Deviation 
    
 
Total Compensation  
 
Pooled 
 
$1,905,712 
 
1,886,753 
(in 1988 dollars) 1988  2,090,191 2,200,570 
 1989  1,721,233 1,493,119 
    
Salary and Bonus Pooled  1,103,363   568,313 
 1988  1,100,058   564,884 
 1989  1,106,669   573,342 
    
Long-term Compensation  Pooled    809,349 1,698,835 
 1988    990,133 2,012,857 
 1989    614,565 1,290,863 
    
Sales     Pooled 7,617,388,000 10,493,214,00
0 
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 1988 7,442,537,000 10,355,703,00
0 
 1989 7,792,240,000 10,656,132,00
0 
    
Return on Equity            Pooled 16.15 10.73 
 1988 16.90  8.41 
 1989 15.40 12.62 
    
CEO Tenure (years) 1988 8.46 6.84 
    
CEO Age 1988 57.09 5.85 
    
Profits  1988 514,939,000 712,871,000 
    
Assets  1988 16,394,642,00
0 
25,890,364,00
0 
 
Table 1, continued 
 
 
 
Industry (number of firms)  
1. Banks and bank holding 
companies 
20 
2. Chemicals 10 
3. Conglomerates 9 
4. Drugs 10 
5. Electronics 10 
6. Food Processing 15 
7. Natural Resources (Fuel) 11 
8. Nonbank Financial 17 
9. Office Equipment & Computers 13 
10.Paper & Forest Products 9 
11.Publishing, Radio & TV  10 
12.Service Industries 8 
13.Telecommunications 12 
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14.Utilities 19 
 
Region (number of firms)  
Midwest 47 
Northeast 68 
Northwest 4 
Southeast 18 
Southwest 36 
 
___________________________________________________________
__ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Comparison of Data of the Top Twenty-Five and Bottom 
Twenty-Five Observations Ranked According to Return on 
Equity 
___________________________________________________________
__ 
 
       Variables                         Top 25     Bottom 
25 
___________________________________________________________
__ 
 
Return on Equity 37.67 -7.50 
Total Compensation ($000’s) 3,210 1,491 
Salary and Bonus  1,275 997 
Long-term Compensation  1,939 494 
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Sales (millions of $) 4,919 9,737 
CEO Tenure (years) 8.6 6.9 
CEO Age 58.1 58.2 
Midwest (observations from) 12 4 
Northeast 9 14 
Northwest 0 0 
Southeast 2 1 
Southwest 2 6 
1. Banks and bank holding 
companies 
0 8 
2. Chemicals 6 1 
3. Conglomerates 0 1 
4. Drugs 7 0 
5. Electronics 0 0 
6. Food Processing 6 2 
7. Natural Resources (Fuel) 0 4 
8. Nonbank Financial 0 1 
9. Office Equipment & Computers 2 1 
10.Paper & Forest Products 0 0 
11.Publishing, Radio & TV  2 1 
12.Service Industries 2 1 
13.Telecommunications 0 2 
14.Utilities 0 3 
___________________________________________________________
__ 
 
Table 3 
 
Estimates of Earnings Equations From 143 Top U.S. 
Corporations During 1988 and 1989.  
(Dependent variable is salary and bonus. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.)  
 
___________________________________________________________
_ 
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 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
Intercept 
(Northeast Utilities) 
 
-14.54 
(371.82) 
 
5.23 
(413.88) 
Return on Equity  7.26 
(2.95) 
 
Sales 0.021 
(0.003) 
0.022 
(0.003) 
Tenure -1.37 
(4.90) 
-1.32 
(5.07) 
Age 7.34 
(5.86) 
7.21 
(6.11) 
Industry Specific Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
  
1. ROE-Banking (ROE)  2.84 
(5.57) 
2. ROE-Chemicals  2.33 
(9.00) 
3. ROE-Conglomerates  -12.87 
(22.13) 
4. ROE-Drugs  11.24 
(10.22) 
5. ROE-Electronics  6.55 
(34.02) 
6. ROE-Food Processing  6.96 
(9.13) 
Table 3, continued 
 
  
7. ROE-Fuel  8.11 
(11.79) 
8. ROE-Nonbank Financial  4.97 
(16.16) 
9. ROE-Office Equipment & 
Computers 
 24.27 
(9.09) 
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10. ROE-Paper and Forest  28.50 
(34.26) 
11. ROE-Publishing, Radio & 
TV 
 2.93 
(16.76) 
12. ROE-Service Industries  -18.39 
(25.00) 
13. ROE-Telecommunications  15.63 
(12.39) 
14. ROE-Utilities  6.08 
(10.97) 
Industry Dummy Variables 
 
  
1. Banks and bank holding 
companies 
519.43 
(237.50) 
564.53 
(262.79) 
2. Chemicals 283.34 
(219.44) 
397.30 
(340.87) 
3. Conglomerates 312.25 
(236.32) 
567.99 
(386.47) 
4. Drugs 651.47 
(217.61) 
553.32 
(329.08) 
5. Electronics 210.31 
(216.54) 
211.91 
(561.45) 
6. Food Processing 208.69 
(360.22) 
203.77 
(400.90) 
7. Natural Resources (Fuel) 266.97 
(205.30) 
241.86 
(283.44) 
Table 3, continued 
 
 
 
  
8. Nonbank Financial 327.34 
(387.13) 
365.34 
(547.93) 
9. Office Equipment & 
Computers 
652.40 
(214.90) 
274.21 
(303.03) 
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10.Paper & Forest Products 437.54 
(367.27) 
-3.13 
(792.26) 
11.Publishing, Radio & TV  436.18 
(360.76) 
505.29 
(477.97) 
12.Service Industries 579.42 
(275.90) 
946.05 
(465.68) 
13.Telecommunications 188.64 
(275.44) 
61.08 
(341.04) 
Regional Dummy Variables   
Northwest -56.54 
(461.26) 
53.13 
(506.73) 
Southeast -45.32 
(253.97) 
-46.80 
(256.79) 
Southwest 108.25 
(215.68) 
100.40 
(226.44) 
Time Dummy Variable 4.23 
(51.03) 
5.08 
(52.91) 
Interaction terms between 
Industry and Region 
yes yes 
Number of Observations 346 346 
SSE 64,205,084 62,523,794 
R2 0.42 .44 
   
 
___________________________________________________________
__ 
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i   Katharine Graham of the Washington Post is the only 
woman CEO among the U.S.’s top 1000 firms (the sample which 
will be used here).   
ii  Total compensation (in standard accounting terms) is 
equal to salary plus bonus plus long-term compensation. 
Long-term compensation, usually in the form of stock 
options, is typically either very large in a particular 
year or zero. Note the large standard deviation for long-
term compensation in Table 1.  
iii  Our competitors may receive more in perks, but their 
total compensation, especially their take-home 
compensation, is considerably below that of their American 
counterparts. 
iv To gauge the extent of other perks see the Wall Street 
Journal, April 18, 1990. 
v See in particular the issues May 1, 1989, October 20, 
1989, and May 7, 1990. 
vi The instrumental variables used were profits, assets, 
tenure, age, industry dummies, a time dummy, regional 
dummies, industry and regional interaction effects, and 
following MaCurdy and Pencaval (1986), industry-specific 
dummies interacted with time. The instrument validity test, 
specified below, comes from Kiviet (1985). References for 
similar tests are found in Wu (1973) and Hausman (1978). 
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χ2(h)= T [(RRSS - URSS)/URSS] 
 
where URSS is the OLS residual sum of squares of the 
unrestricted model, 
 
Y= Xβ + Vδ  +  error 
 
where V = Xhat - X (for only those x's estimated by 
instruments) 
 
and RRSS is the OLS residual sum of squares of the model 
with V restricted to equal zero. 
 
vii For example, the F test between column (1) and (2) gave a 
computed value of  0.58 versus a critical value of 2.04 
with 13 and 346 degrees of freedom and a significance level 
of 0.01. The Kiviet-Wu test of instrument validity for 
column (1) gave a computed value for the  chi-square 
statistic of 6.05 versus a critical value of 9.21 with 2 
degrees of freedom and a significance level of 0.01, hence 
the least squares estimates are reported. 
viii Wall Street Journal, April 18, 1990. Other data mentioned 
in the same issue points to the same conclusion, i.e., only 
personnel managers were estimated to have had higher 
percentage increases in their compensation over the last 
decade.  
ix Corey Rosen and Michael Quarry (1987, p.126) report that 
since 1974 “the number of employee-owned (or partially 
owned) companies has grown from about 1,600 to 8,100, and 
the number of employees owning stock has jumped from 
250,000 to more than eight million.”  
x For example, CEO pay went from approximately 41 times the 
average factory worker pay in 1960 to over 93 times in 
1988, for schoolteachers the ratio went from 38 to 72 in 
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the same period. See Business Week (1989) and the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
xi Frank’s second proposition would support this point, that 
“other things equal, as tasks performed by a group involve 
more sustained and intense interaction and contact between 
coworkers, the values taken by dW/dMP must be smaller 
and/or the variation of earnings values included in the 
group must diminish.” 
xii  See for example the case of Emerson Radio in the New 
York Times August 26, 1990, p. F-17. 
xiii Ben & Jerry’s is a Vermont-based company, known for its 
social responsibility, that has blossomed in the 1980’s 
into a network of nationwide franchises. For more 
information see the Burlington Free Press, September 4, 
1989, p. G-14. 
xiv  All data here are available from either Standard & Poors 
or Business Week. All monetary figures are in 1988 dollars. 
